Nash equilibria applied to Spot-financial equilibria in General equilibrium incomplete market models by Fugarolas, Guadalupe
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Nash equilibria applied to Spot-financial
equilibria in General equilibrium
incomplete market models
Guadalupe Fugarolas
September 2006
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/470/
MPRA Paper No. 470, posted 16. October 2006
NASH EQUILIBRIA APPLIED TO SPOT-FINANCIAL
EQUILIBRIA IN GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MARKET MODELS
Guadalupe Fugarolas Alvarez-Ude
Facultad de Econo´micas. Universidad de Vigo.
Economı´a Aplicada y Territorial. Grupo Analistas.
e-mail : gfugarolas@afi.es
Abstract.We consider a two period pure exchange economy with a finite num-
ber of states of nature at the second date. The economy consists of a real asset
structure and a finite set of durable goods in the initial period that depreciate;
we suppose that there is only one single good available in each state of na-
ture at the second date. In this paper, we demonstrate that the spot-financial
equilibrium can be obtained as a Nash equilibrium of a market game in which
the strategies of the players consist in suggesting prices and quantities for both
goods and assets.
Key words: Incomplete markets, market games, Nash equilibrium, strategic
outcome functions
JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D72
∗I thank Carlos Herve´s Beloso, Emma Moreno Garc´ıa and Juan Pablo Torres Mart´ınez
for useful comments and suggestions. Remaining errors are my own.
∗∗The author acknowledges support by Research Grants BEC2003-09067-C04-01
(Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnolog´ıa and FEDER) and SA070A05 Junta de Castilla y
Leo´n.
1
1 Introduction.
The first studies of games in the economics literature were the papers by Cournot
(1838), Bertrand (1883) and Edgeworth (1925) but these were seen as special
models that did little to change the way economists thought about most prob-
lems. The idea of a general theory of games was introduced by von Neumann
and Morgenstern in their famous 1944 book “Theory of Games and Economic
Behaviour”, which proposed that most economic questions should be analized as
games. Nash (1950) established what came to be known as the noncooperative
concept of Nash equilibrium of a game in normal form. This is a natural gener-
alization of the equilibria studied in specific models by Cournot and Bertrand
where the strategies of the players are simply their choices of quantities and
prices respectively, and it is the starting point for most economic analyses.
Since Nash contribution to the existence of equilibrium points in noncoope-
rative games there has been a growing literature on the strategic approaches to
economic equilibrium. In order to prove existence of Walras equilibrium, Ar-
row and Debreu (1954) and Debreu (1962) extended Nash’s model of a game
in normal form and of a Nash equilibrium to generalized games: by adding a
fictitious price player, who controls the price vector and whose payoff function
is the value of excess demand, they introduce “feasibility” to a game in normal
form; thus, they considered an abstract economy (which is a pseudo-game) and
a social equilibrium. Walras equilibria were obtained then as Nash equilibria
of a pseudo-game that included the market participant. However, there is no
indication as to how prices are formed.
The formation of prices plays a central role in any discussion of the market
process: which of the given economic agents sets the price vector and in what
way? This question gives rise to a series of papers on strategic market games
where, in addition to the consumer behavior, a price mechanism is formulated.
Several types of price-forming mechanisms have been described in which prices
depend on the actions of the traders, avoiding the classical assumption that
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individuals must regard prices as fixed.
The majority of these works proposed strategic market game models of ex-
change economies in the spirit of Cournot and Bertrand to study the relationship
between the Nash equilibria and the competitive equilibria. On one hand, and
following the Cournot tradition, Shapley (1976), Shapley and Shubik (1977),
Dubey and Shapley (1994) and Dubey and Geanakoplos (2003) proposed games
where money is introduced as the stipulated medium of exchange, either as one
of the intrinsically valuable commodities or as “inside” fiat money. These games
adhere completely to the Nash format, i.e., no price player is involved, and it is
shown that their Nash equilibria converge to Walras equilibria.
On the other hand, the analysis of Bertrand was extended by Schmeidler
(1980) and Dubey (1982) who established the coincidence of Nash equilibria and
Walras equilibria. In particular, Schmeidler (1980) provided a strategic market
game model where the exchange mechanism is characterized by a strategic out-
come function that maps agents’ selections of strategies to allocations. For it, it
was proposed a game in strategic form in which the choice of a price vector is a
part of the strategy choice for each player and proved that the Nash equilibrium
of the game is precisely the competitive equilibrium of the Arrow-Debreu pure
exchange economy.
The purpose of this paper is to extend this Schmeidler’s result to a two
period financial economy with an incomplete market structure and in particular,
to analyze the strategic approach to spot-financial equilibrium.
The classical Arrow-Debreu model was extended to take account of uncer-
tainty as Debreu (1959) proposed in Chapter 7 of his “Theory of Value”. In
Debreu’s analysis, the concept of uncertainty is integrated into a general equi-
librium context by introducing a finite set of states of the world and viewing
commodities as differentiated by state, that is, commodities can be differenti-
ated not only by their physical properties and location in space and time but also
by their location in “state”. In the Arrow-Debreu model of general equilibrium
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it is assumed that markets are complete: there is a market and an associated
price for each good in each state of nature. All commodities are traded simul-
taneously, no matter when they are consumed or under what state of the world.
All consumers face only a budget constraint, which is defined across the states,
and one price system.
However, as point out by Magill and Shafer (1991) and Magill and Quinzii
(1996), the Arrow-Debreu model introduces an idealized market structure that
under time and uncertainty can lead to unfeasible redistributions of resources
because of the behavioral imperfections of agents. Hence, a more general market
model must be considered with real and financial markets in which the structure
of markets is incomplete. In these models with incomplete markets the allocation
of resources is modelled by a market structure consisting of a system of spot
markets for real goods coupled with a system of financial markets where assets
are traded.
The characteristic feature of a model with incomplete markets is that con-
sumers face a multiplicity of budget sets and price systems at different times
and under different states of nature. Consumers must hold assets to transfer
wealth among budget constraints: individuals can buy or sell assets and, after
the state of nature is revealed, they trade in the spot market with income de-
rived from the sale of their initial endowments plus the deliveries of the revenues
they receive as a result of their portfolio holdings. Therefore, in the context of
this finance economy, there are markets for income in each state and agents
can transfer income as they want across the states. Whenever the number of
assets is less than the number of states, agents will have only a limited ability
to redistribute their income across the states. In this case, the financial markets
are said to be incomplete.
Incomplete markets have been extensively researched as regards existence
and properties of equilibria (see Hart (1975), Geanakoplos y Polemarchakis
(1985), Geanakoplos (1990) and Geanakoplos, Magill, Quinzii y Dreeze (1990)).
It has been shown, for both the pure exchange and the production case, that
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competitive allocations are not necessary Pareto optimal.
In this paper we consider a two period pure exchange economy with a finite
number of states of nature at the second date. The economy consists of a
real asset structure and a finite set of durable goods in the initial period that
depreciate. We suppose that there is only one single good available in each
state of nature at the second date. Thus, the assets yield payoffs denominated
in a single nume´raire commodity and this precisely makes irrelevant to consider
in our economy nominal or real assets. In any case, individuals can buy or
sell short any amount of the nume´raire assets, in some limited collection. The
outstanding hypothesis is that it is assumed bounded short sales. On other side,
agents are assumed to dispose non-negative amounts of the single good in any
state at date one. In this model the financial market structure is incomplete
and, under standard assumptions on initial endowments and preferences, there
always exists spot-financial equilibrium.
This paper concentrates on highlight that, in this context, the spot-financial
equilibrium can be obtained as a Nash equilibrium of a game in which the
strategies of the players consist in suggesting prices and quantities for goods
and assets. Our approach follows the analysis of Schmeilder (1980). In this
case, the main difficulty to overcome is to guarantee that date one commodity-
bundles are non-negative. Thus, we construct a game in normal form where the
strategy profile of each player consists of suggesting prices and amounts for both
commodities and assets to be traded. In this game, in addition to the strategy
outcome function for the commodities in the first period, it is defined another
for the assets and from both, it is deduced the second date commodity outcome
function. The strategy outcome functions are defined in such a way that, in
equilibrium, they map agents strategies to non-negative consumptions at the
second date. Then, we demonstrate that Nash equilibria of the associated game
coincide with the spot-financial equilibria for the finance economy.
The paper is organized along with two other sections. In section 2 we de-
scribe a two period economy with incomplete market structure and in section 3
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we define the associated game and our main result is stated and proven.
2 The model: a two period finance economy.
We consider a two period exchange economy E under uncertainty with spot and
financial markets. The economy consists of a finite number of agents, a finite
number of goods and a finite number of real assets.
To capture both time and uncertainty we consider a model with two time
periods, t = 0, 1 and a set S = {1, . . . , S} of possible states of nature at date
t = 1. For convenience, date t = 0 is often included as state s = 0, so that in
total there are S + 1 states. Let there be only one good in each state s ∈ S at
date t = 1.
Let L = {1, . . . , L} be the set of goods at date t = 0. These L goods are
supposed to be possible durable, i.e., they are not entire consumed at the initial
date and can be used in t = 1. At the second period, durable goods may have
depreciated. Their depreciation is denominated in terms of the single date 1
good in each state. Precisely, as there is a unique good at t = 1, we consider it
as the numeraire good in each state of nature.
Let Υs : IRL+ → IR be the depreciation structure depending on the state
s ∈ S that occurs in the second period. The depreciation Υs is an increasing
function in the commodity bundle which implies that, if it is differentiable, its
partial derivatives are non-negative. The interpretation is clear: from time to
time goods change in their value and thus monotonicity implies that for each
good this change is directly proportional to its amount. Indeed, Υs is a concave
function; this means that variations in the depreciation are in inverse proportion
to the amounts. Latter on, when we state the hypothesis on the model, we will
single out assumptions on the depreciation structure.
The commodity space is IRn with n = L+ S. The consumption set of agent
i is taken to be Xi = IRn+. It is convenient to write the consumption set as
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Xi = IRL+×IRS+. A consumption bundle is a vector x = (x0, x1, . . . , xs) ∈ IRL+×IRS+
where x0 = (x0 1, . . . , x0L) denotes date 0 consumption of the L goods and xs
represents the consumption of the numeraire good in each state s ∈ {1, . . . , S}.
Let J = {1, . . . , J} be the set of real assets. In this model there are J < S
real assets that can be freely traded at date t = 0. A real asset j is a contract
that can be purchased for the price qj at t = 0 and promises to deliver at date
t = 1 an amount Ajs of units of the good in each state s, for s ∈ S. As there is
only one good consumption in each state, the assets are always numeraire assets.
A real asset is thus characterized by its return vector Aj = (Aj1, . . . , A
j
S) ∈ IRS+.
The exogenous date 1 returns of the J real assets are summarized by the S × J
matrix
A =

A11 . . . A
J
1
...
. . .
...
A1S . . . A
J
S

Then, the matrix A represents the real asset structure of the economy. We
suppose that the rank of A is maximum. Let 〈A〉 denote the subspace of transfers
generated by A, that is, the subspace of IRS spanned by the J columns of A. As
〈A〉 = IRJ 6= IRS , then the asset structure is incomplete.
The set of agents is I = {1, . . . , I}. Each agent i ∈ I has an initial en-
dowment of goods in each state, ωi = (ωi0, ω
i
1, . . . , ω
i
S) ∈ IRL+ × IRS+, where ωi0 =
(ωi0 1, . . . , ω
i
0L) and ω
i
0 l denotes her initial endowment at date 0 of good l, and an
initial endowment of real assets δi = (δi1, . . . , δ
i
J) ∈ IRJ+, with δij ≥ 0. The pref-
erence relation of agent i is represented by a utility function ui : IRL+× IRS+ → IR.
Therefore, the exchange economy with the real asset structure A is defined
by
E =
(
IRL+ × IRS+, (ui, ωi, δi, A), i = 1, . . . I
)
.
The economy is denoted by E(u, ω, δ, A).
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In this economy, there exists a sequential market structure for the trade of
goods and real assets. On one hand, transactions in real assets occur before
the state of nature is known: each agent i, for a price vector q = (q1, . . . , qJ),
trades the J real assets. Let zi = (zi1, . . . , z
i
J) ∈ IRJ denote the ith agent
portfolio. Each coordinate zij represents the number of units of each of the J
real asset purchased (if zij > 0) or sold (if z
i
j < 0) by agent i. A portfolio plan
z = (z1, . . . , zI) is feasible if
I∑
i=1
zij =
I∑
i=1
δij , for all j ∈ J.
On the other hand, agent i chooses a consumption bundle xi = (xi0, . . . , x
i
S)
and makes a choice of consumption today xi0 = (x
i
0 1, . . . , x
i
0 L) ∈ IRl+ versus a
consumption in the future (xi1, . . . , x
i
S) ∈ IRS+, as well as a choice over the relative
amounts of consumption in the different states at date 1. A consumption plan
x = (x1 . . . , xI) is feasible if:
I∑
i=1
xi0 ≤
I∑
i=1
ωi0, and
I∑
i=1
xis ≤
I∑
i=1
ωis +
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
Ajs · zij +
I∑
i=1
Υs(xi0), for all s ∈ S.
Hence, there is a market structure modelled by a collection of spot mar-
kets, for the trading of real goods, together with a system of financial markets
for trading real assets. The financial markets allow each agent to redistribute
income across the states; only by holding assets an agent can transfer wealth
between budget constraints. The spot markets are supposed for each of the
L goods at date 0 and in each state s at date 1. The main feature of a spot
market is that its payment is made at date 1 in state s (if s ≥ 1). Thus, under
a system of spot markets, agents face a multiplicity of S+1 budget constraints,
at different times and under different states of nature.
Let p = (p0, p1, . . . , pS) ∈ IRL+S++ denote the vector of spot prices, where
p0 = (p0 1, . . . , p0L) and p0 l represents the price payable for a unit of good l at
date 0. Note that at t = 1 we assume a single good, so, without loss of generality,
we can put ps = 1 for all s = 1, . . . , S. Hence, from now on p = p0.
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A price system in this economy is therefore a collection (p, q) formed by a
spot price vector p and a price vector q = (q1, . . . , qJ) for real assets traded at
t = 0. Let 4L+J−1 =
(p, q) ∈ IRL++ × IRJ++ |
L∑
l=1
pl +
J∑
j=1
qj = 1
 . For a price
system (p, q), the budget set of agent i is given by
Bi(p, q) = {(xi, zi) ∈ (IRL+ × IRS+)× IRJ | p · xi0 + q · zi ≤ p · ωi0 + q · δi
and xis ≤ ωis +
J∑
j=1
Ajs · zij +Υs(xi0), for all s ∈ S}.
Definition 2.1 A spot-financial equilibrium for the finance economy E is a
pair of actions and prices ((x, z), (p, q)), where (x, z) is a consumption-portfolio
bundle and (p, q) is a price system, such that
(i) (xi, zi) ∈ arg max {ui(xi) | (xi, zi) ∈ Bi(p, q)}, i = 1, . . . , I,
(ii)
I∑
i=1
xi0 =
I∑
i=1
ωi0,
(iii)
I∑
i=1
zij =
I∑
i=1
δij , for all j ∈ J,
(iv)
I∑
i=1
xis =
I∑
i=1
ωis +
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
Ajs · zij +
I∑
i=1
Υs(xi0), for all s ∈ S,
On the whole, the existence of equilibrium in a finance economy as the one
here described is not guarantee. The assumptions we state below on short sales,
initial endowments, preferences and depreciation structure are enough to ensure
the existence of spot-financial equilibrium (see for example Magill and Quinzii
(1996)).In point of fact, in the standard incomplete markets framework-see Rad-
ner (1972) for instance- a bound on short sales eliminates any discontinuity and
guarantees the existence of equilibrium. It is really true that all these hypoth-
esis are not necessary to guarantee the equilibrium existences but we will use
them to prove our main result.
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(A.1 ) (Bounded short sales). There exists a positive real number M such that
zij > −M for all i ∈ I and for all j ∈ J.
(A.2 ) (Strict positivity of endowments). ωi  0 and δi  0 for all i ∈ I.
(A.3 ) (Monotonicity). For each i ∈ I the utility function ui is monotone.
(A.4 ) (Convexity). For each i ∈ I the utility function ui is strictly quasi-concave.
(A.5 ) (Inada). Each i ∈ I prefers an interior commodity bundle to any con-
sumption in the frontier of IRn+.
(A.6 ) (Differentiability). For each i ∈ I the utility function ui is differentiable.
(A.7 ) (Depreciation structure). For each state s ∈ S, Υs is differentiable and
concave.
Observe that, under bounded short sales (assumption (A.1 )), the budget set
Bi(p, q) is compact for all (p, q) ∈ 4L+J−1. Then, there exists a well defined set
of actions bundle that maximizes ui over Bi(p, q).
The concavity assumption of the depreciation structure guarantees that the
budget set Bi(p, q) is convex for any price system (p, q). In fact, Bi(p, q) define
a system of equations, one linear constraint and S constraints such that xis ≤
ωis +
J∑
j=1
Ajs · zij +Υs(xi0). Thus, if (x, z) y (x′, z′) are in Bi(p, q) and α ∈ (0, 1)
then α · (x, z) + (1− α) · (x′, z′) is also in Bi(p, q) because
α · xs + (1− α) · x′s ≤ ωs +
J∑
j=1
Ajs · (α · zij + (1− α) · z
′ i
j )+
α ·Υs(xi0) + (1− α) ·Υs(x
′ i
0 ).
By the concavity of the depreciation structure, Υs(α · xi0 + (1 − α) · x
′ i
0 ) ≥
Υs(xi0) + (1− α) ·Υs(x
′ i
0 ). Hence,
α · xs + (1− α) · x′s ≤ ωs +
J∑
j=1
Ajs · (α · zij + (1− α) · z
′ i
j )+
Υs(α · xi0 + (1− α) · x
′ i
0 ).
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The convexity of Bi(p, q) together with the strict quasi-concavity of the
utility function guarantees that the commodity bundle which maximizes the
utility subject to the constraints embodied in the budget set exists (the budget
set, by (C.1) is compact) and is unique for any price system (p, q). Let dic(p, q)
denote ith agent demand for each price pair (p, q). On the other hand, once the
commodity demand is fixed, there exists a unique vector dia(p, q) that represents
the real asset demand of agent i and for which the S inequations are saturated
(dic(p, q))s ≤ ωis+
J∑
j=1
Ajs ·zij+Υs((dic(p, q))0) are saturated, i.e, are satisfied with
equal. We know that this inequation system has solution and, given the unique
commodity demand, the rank of the S equation system
J∑
j=1
Ajs = (d
i
c(p, q))s −
ωis − Υs((dic(p, q))0) is J < S. Thus S − J equations are a linear combination
of the other J and, therefore, this becomes a Cramer equation system with a
unique solution.
3 Spot-financial equilibrium and Nash.
Let E =
(
IRL+ × IRS+, (ui, ωi, δi, A), i = 1, . . . I
)
be a finance economy. The pur-
pose of this section is to relate the spot-financial market equilibria of this eco-
nomy to the Nash equilibria of a game in strategic form.
Given the exchange economy above E(u, ω, δ, A), we construct a game in
normal form. Let Γ = {Θi, pii}i=1,...,n be a n−person game where Θi is the
strategy set and pii the payoff function of a player i.
The set of strategies for a player i is defined by
Θi = {(xi, zi, pi, qi) ∈ IRL+ × IRJ ×4L+J−1 | pi · xi0 + qi · zi = pi · ωi0 + qi · δi
and ωis +
J∑
j=1
Ajs · zij +Υs(xi0) ≥ 0, for all s ∈ S}.
Note that there is a single good at t = 1, so a player i will choose goods and spot
prices at date 0. Hence, from now on in the game, (xi, zi, pi, qi) = (xi0, z
i, pi0, q
i).
11
Therefore, a player i′s strategy θi is defined by a consumption bundle xi at t = 0,
a portfolio zi, a spot price vector pi and a real asset price vector qi, that is,
θi = (xi, zi, pi, qi) ∈ IRL+ × IRJ × 4L+J−1, such that xi and zi belong to the
budget set of agent i under the price system (pi, qi). Let Θ =
n∏
i=1
Θibe the set of
possible strategy profiles.
Given a strategy profile θ = (θ1, . . . , θn) ∈ Θ, where θi = (xi, zi, pi, qi), let
Ai(θ) denote the set of agents who propose the same prices as player i in the
strategy profile θ. That is,
Ai(θ) = {k ∈ {1, . . . , I} | pk = pi and qk = qi}
Agents who propose different prices, either for goods and/or assets do not trade
at all. Therefore, trade of goods and assets only takes place among members of
Ai(θ).
Let f i0 : Θ→ IRL+ be the commodity bundle defined by
f i0(θ) = x
i −
∑
k∈Ai(θ)
(
xk − ωk0
)
Card(Ai(θ))
where Card(Ai(θ)) denotes the cardinality of the set Ai(θ), let f ia : Θ→ IRJ be
the real asset bundle with components
f ia j(θ) = z
i
j −
∑
k∈Ai(θ)
(
zkj − δkj
)
Card(Ai(θ))
for j ∈ J, and let f i1(θ) = ωis +
J∑
j=1
Ajs · f ia j(θ) + Υs(f i0(θ)) for all s ∈ S.
Now we define the function f i as
f i(θ) =
(
f i0(θ) , f
i
1(θ)
)
if f i0(θ) ≥ 0 and f i1(θ) ≥ 0
and otherwise
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f i(θ) =
ωi0 −  · 1L ,
ωis + J∑
j=1
Ajs · δij +Υs(ωi0)

s∈S
−  · 1S

where 1L = (
L︷ ︸︸ ︷
1, . . . , 1), 1S = (
S︷ ︸︸ ︷
1, . . . , 1) and  > 0 is such that
ωi0 −  · 1L ,
ωis + J∑
j=1
Ajs · δij +Υs(ωi0)

s∈S
−  · 1S

is non-negative.
The function f i : Θ → IRL+ × IRS+ denotes the outcomes of player i at dates
0 and 1 under each strategy profile θ ∈ Θ. Then, the ith agent payoff function
pii : Θ→ IR is defined by
pii(θ) = ui
(
f i(θ)
)
.
For a profile θ, let θ−i denote a strategy selection for all players but i. So we
write θ = (θ−i, θi). A strategy profile θ∗ = (θ−i ∗, θi ∗) is a Nash equilibrium
if for all players i,
ui
(
f i(θ∗ −i, θ∗ i)
) ≥ ui (f i(θ∗ −i, θi)) , for all θi ∈ Θi.
Theorem 3.1 Let E be an exchange economy with the real asset structure A
satisfying assumptions (A.1)− (A.7), with N ≥ 3. Let Γ be the game in normal
form associated with E. Then
I. If θ∗ is a Nash equilibrium of the game Γ, then p∗ i = p∗ and q∗ i = q∗ for
all i ∈ N and (f i0(θ∗), f ia(θ∗), p∗, q∗) is a spot-financial equilibrium of the
economy E.
II. If (xi ∗, zi ∗, p∗, q∗) is a spot-financial equilibrium of E then the strategy
profile θi ∗ = (x∗ i, z∗ i, p∗ i, q∗ i) for each i = 1, . . . , I is a Nash equilibrium
of Γ.
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Demonstration.
I. Let θ∗ be a Nash equilibrium of Γ. We will see that (f i0(θ
∗), f ia(θ
∗), p∗, q∗) is
an equilibrium of E.
First, we will see that if θ∗ = (θ1 ∗, . . . , θn ∗), with θ∗ i =
(
x∗ i, z∗ i, p∗ i, q∗ i
)
,
is a Nash equilibrium of Γ, then f i0(θ
∗) ≥ 0 and f i1(θ∗) ≥ 0 for all i = 1, . . . , I.
For it suppose that there exists an agent i such that f i0(θ
∗) < 0 or f i1(θ
∗) < 0.
Then, f i(θ∗) =
ωi0 −  · 1L ,
ωis + J∑
j=1
Ajs · δij +Υs(ωi0)

s∈S
−  · 1S
 . Con-
sider that player i chooses θ˜i = (ωi0, δ
i, p, q) with p 6= p∗ k or q 6= q∗ k for
any k 6= i. Note that in this case Ai(θ∗) = {i}, so f i0(θ∗ −i, θ˜i) = ωi0 and
f ia(θ
∗ −i, θ˜i) = δi. Then the outcome is
f i(θ∗ −i, θ˜i) =
ωi0,
ωis + J∑
j=1
Ajs · δij +Υs(ωi0)

s∈S

By the monotonicity of ui, it follows that ui
(
f i(θ∗ −i, θ˜i)
)
> ui
(
f i(θ∗
)
), that
is, pii
(
θ∗ −i, θ˜i
)
> pii(θ∗), so θ∗ would not be a Nash equilibrium of Γ. Hence, if
θ∗ is a Nash equilibrium of Γ, then f i0(θ
∗) ≥ 0 and f i1(θ∗) ≥ 0, which implies that
f i(θ∗) =
(
f i0(θ
∗), f i1(θ
∗)
)
for all i ∈ I. Therefore, under the Nash equilibrium
strategy profile, θ∗, the commodity and real asset bundle that player i obtains
is (f i0(θ
∗), f ia(θ
∗)).
Next, we will prove that for any different agents, i, k ∈ I, the payoff that
agent i gets with f i(θ∗) is greater or equal than her indirect utility at prices
(p∗ k, q∗ k) proposed by agent k. We will distinguish two cases: (i) if k ∈ Ai(θ∗)
and (ii) k 6∈ Ai(θ∗).
If (i) occurs, then (p∗ i, q∗ i) = (p∗ k, q∗ k). In this case, Card(Ai(θ∗))−1 6= 0
because Ai(θ∗) ≥ 2. Player i could receive her demands of goods and real assets
at prices (p∗ k, q∗ k) by choosing her strategy θi =
(
xi, zi, p∗ k, q∗ k
)
where
xi =
1
Card(Ai(θ∗))− 1
η · Card(Ai(θ∗)) + ∑
r∈Ai(θ∗)\{i}
x∗ r −
∑
r∈Ai(θ∗)
ωr0

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and
zi =
1
Card(Ai(θ∗))− 1
µ · Card(Ai(θ∗)) + ∑
r∈Ai(θ∗)\{i}
z∗ r −
∑
r∈Ai(θ∗)
δr

It is easy to see that θi ∈ Θi. Note that
(f i0(θ
∗ −i, θi), f ia(θ
∗ −i, θi)) = (dic(p
∗ i, q∗ i), dia(p
∗ i, q∗ i)) =
= (dic(p
∗ k, q∗ k), dia(p
∗ k, q∗ k)).
Since θ∗ is a Nash equilibrium then
ui(f i(θ∗ −i, θ∗ i)) ≥ ui(f i(θ∗ −i, θi)) = vi(p∗ k, q∗ k)
where vi(p∗ k, q∗ k) is the indirect utility function of agent i.
Now we will prove that for all r ∈ Ai(θ∗), (fr0 (θ∗), fra(θ∗)) ∈ Br(p∗ k, q∗ k).
Suppose that there exists an agent r ∈ Ai(θ∗) such that,
p∗ k · fr0 (θ∗) + q∗ k · fra(θ∗) > p∗ k · ωr0 + q∗ k · δr
As
∑
r∈Ai(θ∗)
fr0 (θ
∗) =
∑
r∈Ai(θ∗)
ωr0 and
∑
r∈Ai(θ∗)
fra(θ
∗) =
∑
r∈Ai(θ∗)
δr, then it has to
exist another agent r′ ∈ Ai(θ∗) such that
p∗ k · fr′0 (θ∗) + q∗ k · fr
′
a (θ
∗) < p∗ k · ωr′0 + q∗ k · δr
′
.
and fr
′
(θ∗) =
(
fr
′
0 (θ
∗), fr
′
1 (θ
∗)
)
. By monotonicity of ui (assumption (A.3)),
ur
′
(fr
′
(θ∗)) < vr
′
(p∗, q∗), which is a contradiction. Then, (fr0 (θ
∗), fra(θ
∗)) ∈
Br(p∗ k, q∗ k), for all r ∈ Ai(θ∗). As ur(fr(θ∗)) ≥ vr(p∗ k, q∗ k) for all demands
(drc(p
∗ k, q∗ k), dra(p
∗ k, q∗ k)), then (fr0 (θ
∗), fra(θ
∗)) = (drc(p
∗ k, q∗ k), dra(p
∗ k, q∗ k))
for all r ∈ Ai(θ∗). Hence, we conclude that
(f i0(θ
∗), f ia(θ
∗)) = (dic(p
∗ k, q∗ k), dia(p
∗ k, q∗ k)).
If (ii) occurs, then (p∗ i, q∗ i) 6= (p∗ k, q∗ k). In this case, player i could still
receive her demands of goods and real assets at prices (p∗ k, q∗ k) by choosing
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her strategy θi =
(
xi, zi, p∗ k, q∗ k
)
where
xi =
1
Card(Ak(θ∗))
·
η · (Card(Ak(θ∗)) + 1) + ∑
r∈Ak(θ∗)
x∗ r −
∑
r∈Ak(θ∗)
⋃
{i}
ωr0

and
zi =
1
Card(Ak(θ∗))
·
µ · (Card(Ak(θ∗)) + 1) + ∑
r∈Ak(θ∗)
z∗ r −
∑
r∈Ak(θ∗)
⋃
{i}
δr

It is easy to see that θi ∈ Θi. Note that
(f i0(θ
∗ −i, θi), f ia(θ
∗ −i, θi)) = (dic(p
∗ k, q∗ k), dia(p
∗ k, q∗ k)).
Since θ∗ is a Nash equilibrium, it follows that
ui(f i(θ∗ −i, θ∗ i)) ≥ ui(f i(θ∗ −i, θi)) = vi(p∗ k, q∗ k).
So ui(f i(θ∗ −i, θ∗ i)) ≥ vi(p∗ k, q∗ k).
Now we will see that if θ∗ is a Nash equilibrium, then all players propose
the same prices:
If there exists an agent i such that Card(Ai(θ∗)) ≥ 2, then Ak(θ∗) = {1, . . . , I}
for every k.
For it, and by contradiction, suppose that there exists an agent k such that
k 6∈ Ai(θ∗), so (p∗ k, q∗ k) 6= (p∗ i, q∗ i). Since
∑
r∈Ai(θ∗)
fr0 (θ
∗) =
∑
r∈Ai(θ∗)
ωr0 and∑
r∈Ai(θ∗)
fra(θ
∗) =
∑
r∈Ai(θ∗)
δr, there are two cases:
(a) There exists r ∈ Ai(θ∗) such that p∗ k · fr0 (θ∗) + q∗ k · fra(θ∗) < p∗ k · ωr0 +
q∗ k · δr .
(b) For any r ∈ Ai(θ∗), p∗ k · fr0 (θ∗) + q∗ k · fra(θ∗) = p∗ k · ωr0 + q∗ k · δr .
If (a) is the case, there exists (yc, ya) such that
p∗ k · (fr0 (θ∗) + yc) + q∗ k · (fra(θ∗) + ya) = p∗ k · ωr0 + q∗ k · δr .
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Since (p∗, q∗) ∈ 4L+J−1 and by the monotonicity of ui, then vr(p∗ k, q∗ k) >
ur(fr(θ∗)) a contradiction with ur(fr(θ∗)) ≥ vr(p∗ k, q∗ k).
Suppose that (b) occurs, then p∗ k ·fr0 (θ∗)+q∗ k ·fra(θ∗) = p∗ k ·ωr0+q∗ k ·δr ,
for any r ∈ Ai(θ∗). We will prove that (p∗ i, q∗ i) = (p∗ k, q∗ k). Since r ∈ Ai(θ∗),
it follows (by (i)) that (fro (θ
∗), fra(θ
∗)) = (drc(p
∗ k, q∗ k), dra(p
∗ k, q∗ k)). Given
that Card(Ai(θ∗)) ≥ 2, (fro (θ∗), fra(θ∗)) = (drc(p∗ i, q∗ i), dra(p∗ i, q∗ i)) for all
r ∈ Ai(θ∗). Then
(
drc(p
∗ k, q∗ k), dra(p
∗ k, q∗ k)
)
=
(
drc(p
∗ i, q∗ i), dra(p
∗ i, q∗ i)
)
.
Let Lr be the agent r’s Lagrangean function defined by
Lr(xr, zr, λ) = ur(xr) + λi0
(
pi · ωr0 + qi · δr − pi · xr0 − qi · zr
)
+
+
S∑
s=1
λis
ωrs + J∑
j=1
Ajs · zrj +Υs(xr0)− xrs

where we set the superindex i to refer the vector of Lagrange multipliers as-
sociated with the maximization problem at prices (pi, qi). We will write λk =
(λk0 , λ
k
1 , . . . , λ
k
S) the vector of Lagrange multipliers associated with the maxi-
mization problem at prices (pk, qk). Then, from the first order conditions for
the problem at prices (pi, qi), we get that
(1)
∂ur
∂xr0
= λi0 · pi −
S∑
s=1
λis ·
∂Υs
∂xr0
(2)
∂ur
∂xrs
= λis, s=1,. . . ,S
(3) −λi0 · qij +
S∑
s=1
λisA
j
s = 0, for each j ∈ J.
In the same way, for her problem at prices of goods pk and prices of real assets
qk, we obtain that
(1)
∂ur
∂xr0
= λk0 · pk −
S∑
s=1
λks ·
∂Υs
∂xr0
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(2)
∂ur
∂xrs
= λks , s=1,. . . ,S
(3) −λk0 · qkj +
S∑
s=1
λksA
j
s = 0, for each j ∈ J.
Since the solution in both problems (the demand) is the same, we get from (2)
that λis = λ
k
s . Then, by (1) we obtain that p
∗ i = γ ·p∗ k, with γ = λ
k
0
λi0
, and by (3)
that qi ∗j = γ ·q∗ kj . Since (pi ∗, qi ∗) and (p∗ k, q∗ k) are in the simplex 4L+J−1, it
follows that (p∗ k, q∗ k) = (p∗ i, q∗ i), a contradiction with (p∗ k, q∗ k) 6= (p∗ i, q∗ i)
supposed above.
Hence, it only remains to demonstrate that there exists an agent i for which
Card(Ai(θ∗)) ≥ 2 to conclude that in Nash equilibrium all players propose
the same prices. For it, and by contradiction, suppose that Ai(θ∗) = {i} for
every i. In this case, (f i0(θ
∗), f ia(θ
∗)) = (ωi0, δ
i) for every i. Consider any agent
i. There exists a (p, q) in 4L+J−1 such that di0(p, q) = ωi0 and dia(p, q) = δi.
Since I ≥ 3, Card{(p∗ k, q∗ k) | k 6= i} ≥ 2 and there exists k 6= i such that
(p∗ k, q∗ k) 6= (p∗ i, q∗ i). Then by definition of (p, q), vi(p∗ k, q∗ k) > vi(p, q). By
(ii), ui(f i(θ∗)) ≥ vi(p∗ k, q∗ k), so ui(f i(θ∗)) > vi(p, q) a contradiction. Then
Card(Ai(θ∗)) ≥ 2.
II. Let (x∗, z∗, p∗, q∗) be an equilibrium of E.
Define θi ∗ = (x∗ i, z∗ i, p∗, q∗) for every i. Then (f i0(θ
∗), f ia(θ
∗)) = (x∗ i, z∗ i).
Also (x∗ i, z∗ i) ∈ (dic(p∗, q∗), dia(p∗, q∗)) .
Let θi = (x∗ i, z∗ i, p, q) with (p, q) 6= (p∗, q∗). In this case the bundle
is (f i0(θ
∗ −i, θi), f ia(θ
∗ −i, θi)) = (ωi0, δ
i), so pii(θ∗ −i, θi) = ui(f i(θ∗ −i, θi)) ≤
pii(θ∗) = ui(f i(θ∗)) = vi(p∗, q∗). On other hand, let θi = (xi, zi, p∗, q∗). Then
pii(θ∗ −i, θi) = ui(f i(θ∗ −i, θi)) ≤ pii(θ∗) = ui(f i(θ∗)) = vi(p∗, q∗).
Therefore, given the strategy profile θ∗, no agent i can get greater payoffs
by choosing a strategy different from θ∗ i, while the other players choose θ∗ −i.
Hence, θ∗ is a Nash equilibrium of Γ.
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Q.E.D.
To sum up, in this paper we extend the analysis of Schmeidler (1980) to a
two period finance economy with S ≥ 1 states of nature at the second date cha-
racterized by durable goods that depreciate and an incomplete numeraire asset
structure. For it we have constructed a game in normal form associated to the
economy where each player strategy profile is given by prices and quantities of
goods and assets and the strategy outcome functions defined map strategies to
portfolio and non-negative consumption bundles in both periods. We demon-
strate that Nash equilibria of the associated game coincide with spot-finacial
equilibria of the underlying economy.
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